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ABSTRACT: 
Parking regulation is seen as a good option to encourage modal shift in order to tackle congestion 
and pollution in metropolitan areas. Market-clearing curbside pricing is rarely implemented and 
policy makers have tended to make off-street parking provision their main tool to address 
excessive curbside demand. Research devoted to garage parking is far less well developed, even 
though public authorities provide both curbside and garage parking that compete with privately 
operated facilities. 
In this paper the impact of garage fare and curbside regulation characteristics (fare and type of 
dedicated spaces) on garage parking demand are investigated. Aggregate occasional and 
subscribers parking demand is analyzed by means of two different econometric models estimated 
using a panel from Barcelona’s public parking authority (BSM) that covers 34 garage facilities 
with yearly data for the period 2006-2012. 
We find that both demand segments show a negative elasticity to garage fare. Only occasional 
parkers show a clear substitution effect with a curbside premium (€0.55/hour). Our finding 
suggests that the actual pricing efficiency gap in Barcelona can range between €0.45 and €1.05 
due to the mismatch between curbside and garage pricing regimes; for which we propose some 
policy alternatives. This stresses the need for a single integrated market approach to parking 
management, in order to overcome market distortions and achieve efficiency. Additionally, our 
results show that the characteristics of curbside parking spaces (allowance and time limits) play 
a role in garage demand determination, yet pricing is much more efficient trigger for behavioral 
change. 
Keywords: Parking; Off-street parking; On-street parking; Garage parking; Curbside parking; 
Parking regulation, Price elasticity 
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1 Introduction 
Major urban areas have broadly adopted parking regulations and pricing as their main 
travel demand management tool to tackle excessive traffic demand-related externalities 
(like congestion and pollution). This tool has relatively low implementation costs, better 
public acceptance than road pricing, and can be controlled directly by local government 
(Litman, 2006; Button, 2006; Ison, 2014; and Rye & Koglin, 2014). 
Although parking is a private good (rivalrous and excludable), it is often publicly provided 
both on-street (curbside) and off-street (in garages) (ITDP, 2010 and 2011). Public 
provision is justified on the grounds of market distortions: (i) a search externality imposed 
by drivers cruising for empty spots (excessive curbside demand); and (ii) garages’ 
localized market power that arises from the discrete spacing of lots, due to construction 
scale economies (Inci, 2015). In order to achieve efficiency in this market, cruising must 
be eliminated by setting the right fare differential between curbside and garage parking, 
and by allocating the right quantity of demand to the most suitable lot at each moment 
(first-best). The fact that users are willing to pay a premium for on-street parking (Kobus 
et al., 2013) suggests that the curbside fare should be higher than the garage fare, in the 
presence of a search externality. Thus, if curbside and garage parking strategies are not 
coordinated, inefficient use of resources is likely to arise. If curbside parking is 
underpriced, it tends to be congested, slow down through traffic, and cause 
underutilization of public garages. 
However, policy makers have tended to keep prices low and have focused on the 
expansion of controlled parking zones containing different types of dedicated curbside 
spaces, with a clear bias towards residential permits (i.e. mixed use or resident-
exclusive, rather than commercial spaces)1. The main tool used to address excessive 
demand is still to increase garage supply (despite its high cost), to the extent that the 
vast majority of parking spaces in European cities are provided by off-street parking 
garage facilities2 (ITDP, 2010; 2011; and Rye & Koglin, 2014). 
In this context, the paper aims to study the complex role of public authority in 
simultaneous garage and curbside parking provision, by analyzing how both regulatory 
instruments interact with garage demand. It should allow public authorities to efficiently 
coordinate both instruments, adopt sounder parking pricing and space regulation 
                                                 
1
 Mixed use spaces are implemented in cities such as Amsterdam, London, Paris, Munich, 
Copenhagen, Stockholm and Chicago. Resident-exclusive schemes are implemented in London, 
Munich, San Francisco and Seattle (See ITDP, 2010; 2011). 
2
 The ratio of garage to curbside spaces is clearly above 2, except in cities where underground 
parking construction would be extremely expensive (ITDP, 2010; 2011). 
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schemes, and advise on the potential impacts of policy changes (also for private garage 
operators). 
We provide an empirical estimation of the responsiveness of aggregate demand for 
garages to price and to the characteristics of curbside regulations, for both occasional 
parkers3 and subscribers4. We use a panel from Barcelona’s public parking authority 
(BSM) that covers 34 garage facilities with yearly transaction data summaries for the 
period 2006-2012. This method is far less data-demanding than microeconometric 
approaches, and it can be applied easily to other cities, regardless of their technology 
for gathering parking data5. 
We find that both occasional parkers and subscribers show a similar negative elasticity 
to garage fares, but only occasional parkers show a clear substitution effect with a 
preference for on-street parking. We estimate an average curbside premium of 
€0.55/hour, which supports theoretical claims that curbside fares should be set higher 
than garage fares (above the curbside premium, to eliminate cruising) (Arnott, 2006; and 
Inci & Lindsey, 2015). This highlights the current inefficiency in the city of Barcelona’s 
pricing scheme; that ranges between €0.45 and €1.05 per hour for users facing no 
discounts due to the uncoupling between curbside and garage policies. In order to bridge 
this gap we propose different policy options; that include a bold increase of curbside fare, 
a cut on garage fare and a cross-subsidy from the curb if it needs to be set below average 
cost. 
Additionally, we find that the characteristics of space regulations have an impact on 
demand as well as on pricing. Commercial spaces help to shift long-term parkers to 
garages, but also attract occasional parkers to the curb. Mixed use spaces show no 
statistically significant impact on garage demand, which suggests that providing parking 
permits for residents does not add additional demand or shift the potential of occasional 
parkers towards garages. In fact, mixed use spaces slightly reduce the number of garage 
subscribers, and shift long-term parking to the curb. 
All this stresses that the public authority should integrate curbside and garage parking 
into a single-market regulation approach, to overcome distortions and achieve efficiency. 
                                                 
3
 Following Tsamboulas (2001), we use the term “occasional” to describe those parkers who 
search for parking on the spot and pay on an hourly basis; even they can be relatively regular 
visitors to the area but not enough to sign a garage subscription plan (non-subscribers). 
4
 Parkers who have signed a garage subscription plan payed on a monthly basis that grants them 
a reserved space, also described elsewhere as monthly parkers. 
5
 Note that our data is gathered from the public parking authority; private operator counterparts 
would rarely be available. 
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And it also suggests the need to consider the interactions with the private sector that 
might devote further research. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature on the issue at 
stake. Section 3 briefly presents the case study of Barcelona. In Section 4 we describe 
the methodological approach and the data used in the analysis. Section 5 presents and 
discusses the results of models, and Section 6 highlights the main conclusions. 
2 Literature review 
Theoretical research work has focused on the optimal curbside parking regulation 
problem. In recent years, relevant contributions have also been made that introduce the 
interaction of curbside parking regulations with garage parking in spatial competition 
models; see Inci (2015) for a complete review. 
Spatial competition models proposed by Arnott (2006) and Inci & Lindsey (2015) show 
that the full price of parking is the outcome of the interaction between garage operators 
and the cruising level that makes curbside and garage parking equally costly. They point 
out that the key to eliminate cruising by allocating excessive curbside demand to garage 
parking is to keep the appropriate fare differential between them. This suggests that, in 
the case of inelastic demand, it will be welfare-enhancing to increase curbside fares, as 
they do not modify the full cost of parking, but convert cruising time costs into meter 
revenues. Additionally, Inci & Lindsey (2015) also suggest that efficiency can be attained 
regardless of the curbside fare by regulating prices in the garage sector, overcoming the 
localized market power issue, and even through the tacit or explicit collusion that may 
arise in a market where the same players interact for long periods (Froeb et al., 2003). 
However, none of the previously mentioned studies took into account the role of public 
administration in the simultaneous provision of garage and curbside parking, and the 
potential competition effects this might induce in the private garage sector. 
Empirical studies on parking demand have largely focused on the impact of on-street 
parking regulations on commuters’ travel choices, using stated or revealed preference 
surveys; see Marsden (2006) and Concas & Nayak (2012) for a complete review. The 
literature suggests that curbside parking demand is negatively related to curbside fare, 
but its sensitivity depends on user and trip characteristics. Curbside demand decreases 
with income (Gillen, 1977; Shoup & Wilson, 1992), increases with stay duration (Khodaii 
et al, 2010; Kobus et al., 2013), depends on trip purpose (Kelly & Clinch, 2006; Simicevic 
et al., 2012b) and increases with the level of alternative transportation modes (Hess, 
2001; Weis et al., 2012). Additionally, it is expected to be non-linear and heterogeneous 
among demand segments (Kelly & Clinch, 2006; Tsamboulas, 2001). Based on a meta-
analysis regression, Concas & Nayak (2012) report an average demand elasticity of -
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0.39 with respect to parking fare, which is slightly lower for the US (-0.30) and much 
higher for non-US studies (-0.86). 
Only some of the most recent works take advantage of parking transaction data; see 
Kelly & Clinch (2009), Ibeas et al. (2011), Pierce & Shoup (2013) and Ottosson et al. 
(2013), Madsen et al. (2013) and Kobus et al. (2013). And very few studies have 
analyzed the specific behavior of garage users, and the interactions between on-street 
and off-street parking regulation tools (i.e. fares, time limits, parking permits, type of 
spaces and their spatial distribution or the level of enforcement); see Shiftan (2002), 
Khodaii et al. (2010), Simicevic et al. (2012a, 2013), Tsamboulas (2001) and Kobus et 
al. (2013). 
Kobus et al. (2013) and Simicevic et al. (2013) found that both curbside and garage 
parking demand are negatively related to parking fare; but only Kobus el al. (2013) 
reports garage demand elasticity estimates ranging from -2.2 to -1.5 for 1 hour and 20 
minute stays respectively. 
The substitution effect between garage and curbside parking was first empirically 
suggested by Kobus et al. (2013), who estimated probit models on the choice between 
curbside and garage parking, based on stay duration. They found that users are willing 
to pay a premium for on-street parking that ranges from €0.37 to €0.60 per hour, and 
users who park for longer durations are more sensitive to fares. Simicevic et al. (2013) 
reached a similar conclusion from the fact that the off-street option becomes more likely 
to be chosen the tighter the time limits on the curbside. This implies that even small 
reductions in the fare differential would greatly increase curbside demand and therefore 
cruising, which could be worsened by the fact that garage operators hold potentially high 
pricing power with inelastic parking demand, especially for short-stay trips. However, no 
cross-price elasticity estimates are available in the literature. 
Additionally, Tsamboulas (2001) highlights that occasional garage parkers’ and garage 
subscribers’ changes in parking location and transport mode depend on a different set 
of criteria. This is of special relevance for garage operators as they offer parking spaces 
to both demand segments to make the most of their available capacity, and subscribers 
tend to be residents of the area who may be eligible for parking permits for the curbside. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effects of curbside regulations’ characteristics 
on aggregate garage parking demand, both for occasional parkers (OCC) and 
subscribers (SUB), and to try to combine previous findings in a single framework. This is 
extremely relevant for public authorities, as they need to quantify the complex 
interactions between parking regulation instruments in order to take policy actions. Our 
empirical model is fairly simplistic with low demands on data. It can be applied to any 
city, regardless of the level of its parking data-gathering technology. 
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3 Parking in Barcelona: context and policy 
Barcelona is the second largest city in Spain, with a population of 1.6M inhabitants (4.5M 
in its metropolitan area). It is the largest Mediterranean city, and one of the most densely 
populated in Europe (15,900 inhab/km2). Since the 1960s, it has experienced a process 
of progressive suburbanization that has increased traffic demand and associated parking 
needs. 
Following a conventional approach, curbside regulated spaces were first introduced in 
1983 to deter long stays and promote turnover in the central business district’s (CBD) 
commercial streets, reaching 7,158 regulated parking spaces in 2004. To promote the 
shift of curbside long stay parking to off-street, and to specialize curbside parking for 
short stays, the public authority followed a policy of increasing off-street supply by 
promoting the construction of 11,000 garage parking spaces between 1997 and 2004. 
Despite these measures, congestion kept increasing, which drove urban mobility 
towards total gridlock. The RACC (2007) estimated that congestion in Barcelona implied 
about 26M hours lost per year, equivalent to a global cost of €384M (about 0.3% of 
Catalonia’s GDP). In order to overcome this situation, a city-wide curbside parking 
regulation initiative called ÀREA was introduced in the CBD in 2005, and was extended 
to almost the entire city by 2009. It was introduced as a trip deterrence measure, aimed 
at alleviating congestion and reducing cruising by transforming free curbside spaces to 
regulated spaces, and integrating all the previous on-street parking measures under a 
single management parking authority (BSM). It currently consists of 55,000 regulated 
parking spaces with dedicated uses: (i) commercial activities (blue); (ii) mixed use, 
including both residents and commercial parking (green); (iii) resident-exclusive (green 
exclusive); (iv) hauling; and (v) free spaces for motorbikes. These parking spaces are 
split into 22 regulatory zones covering almost the entire area of the city, with 4 fixed 
fare/hour bands operating during traffic peak time (i.e.: Monday to Friday 8h-14h and 
16h-20h) with a maximum stay limit (1 to 2 hours)6. 
The expansion of curbside regulation has largely involved the introduction of mixed-use 
spaces, as these offer a virtually free parking permit to residents but charge visitors, 
which reduces opposition to the measure. Similar approaches have been used 
elsewhere, as reported by the ITDP (2010, 2011). This system is justified by the 
assumption that granting access to residents will impose further limitations on visitors 
(besides pricing), and push them to park off-street in a well-developed garage network. 
However, this somewhat contradicts both the theoretical and empirical evidence (Van 
Ommeren et al, 2011). 
                                                 
6
 Parking meters accept coins and credit cards, but since 2015 they have been upgraded to accept 
smartphone payment via App. 
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The expansion of the public garage network reached a plateau with the implementation 
of curbside regulations, although some facilities have been completed and others are 
still under construction. It is interesting to note that the supply of public garages has 
increased twice as much as that of curbside regulated spaces. Only in recent years, the 
supply of public garages has been dramatically reduced after several facilities were 
closed due to urban transformations. Currently, BSM owns more than 100 facilities with 
a total supply of about 43,000 parking spaces. Following city council estimates for 2012 
(no official data exists on private operators), this means that the public parking operator 
directly controls roughly 23% of the total public access garage supply in the city. Publicly 
managed garages apply a homogeneous fare/hour pricing scheme (non-progressive), 
regardless of their spatial location, which shows no evident linkage to on-street 
regulation. However, the garage subscription cost is defined at each facility. 
It is also important to stress that no other relevant change in the parking sector has been 
detected during the ÀREA implementation, as parking minimum requirements in new 
constructions, broad private supply and regulation has remained the same. 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Aggregate demand function 
We estimate an aggregate demand function using a panel data approach, where cross-
section observations correspond to parking garages repeatedly observed throughout a 
time span. This allows us to model variations in demand resulting from policy and 
socioeconomic changes over time and across garage facilities. 
We assume, as described in (1), that aggregate demand () in each parking facility () 
and period of time () is a function of garage characteristics (), the characteristics of 
alternative on-street parking () and other neighborhood characteristics affecting car 
usage demand () within each garage facility catchment area (defined as a buffer of 
radius D around each facility)7, garage-specific unobserved heterogeneity (	) and time-
specific effects (
) to cope with area expansions or specific shocks (i.e. economic 
recession). The demand function also depends on an idiosyncratic error term (). 
As we are interested in analyzing two demand segments, namely occasional parkers 
who pay on an hourly basis and parking subscribers (who pay on a monthly basis), we 
also develop two models with slightly different variables specification, as in Tsamboulas 
(2001). In our case, we specify two aggregate demand functions using different 
                                                 
7
 The catchment area of each facility is defined as the area within a fixed distance buffer for each 
garage facility. 
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aggregate demand measures. The characteristics of each of them impose the adoption 
of two differentiated econometric approaches: the occasional parking (OCC) model is 
specified as an event count model estimated by means of negative binomial 
specifications, adapted to panel data; whist the subscribers parking (SUB) model is 
estimated by least squares. The data used and each model specification are described 
in detail in the following subsections. 
 = (, , , 	 , 
 , ) (1) 
Where  
 = own garage characteristics 
 = alternative on-street parking characteristics (parking spaces, types and fares) 
 = neighborhood characteristics affecting car usage (income, motorization rate) 
	 = garage-specific fixed effects 

 = time-specific effect 
 = idiosyncratic error term 
4.2 The data 
Our dataset covers 34 of BSM’s garage facilities for the period 2006-2012 (238 
observations). BSM does operate some other facilities, but their demand behavior is 
assumed to be pretty different due to the parking policy context in their surroundings. In 
order to keep atypical observations out of our sample, we eliminated specific facilities 
that are located in the urban fringe, where ÀREA is not fully implemented and free 
parking is extensively available. We introduced both garage and curbside characteristics 
in a GIS software, which translates into a series of points that embed the information of 
parking regulation for each year; Figure 1 shows an example of the available data. In 
order to compute our explanatory variables related to curbside and neighborhood 
characteristics we specify the catchment areas as a buffer around each facility with a 
radius of 500 meters8. The main descriptive statistics for all variables included in the 
OCC and SUB models are displayed in Table 1. 
                                                 
8
 We estimated the model for 500 and 800 meters (0.3 and 0.5 miles), following evidence reported 
by Lin & Wang (2015), and the maximum acceptable outdoor walking distance described in Smith 
& Butcher (1994). The results are consistent across buffers, but can be made available upon 
request. In this case, we only report the results for the 500-meter buffers, as this distance is 
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Figure 1. Detail of the information integrated in a GIS software to compute explanatory variables within 500m buffer 
around each garage facility in the sample. 
The dependent variable for the OCC model is garage parking demand at each garage 
facility, measured as yearly purchased parking hours () at each facility () and period 
(); made available in BSM parking facilities’ annual reports. The latest studies using 
parking transaction data tend to define demand by occupancy rate (Ottosson et al., 2013; 
Madsen et al., 2013). However, we believe that yearly purchased parking hours is a 
better demand indicator in our case. The fact that occasional parkers and subscribers 
share the same facility raises awareness about the validity of occupancy rate changes 
to measure demand changes, as parking subscribers purchase the right to park in 
advance, and thus their parking spaces are unavailable to other users, whether they park 
or not. Additionally, yearly purchased parking hours can be used to directly compute 
occupancy rates, revenues and changes in average stay length. 
It has to be noted that this dependent variable specification does not follow a normal 
distribution, but a negative binomial one. The preponderance of relatively small numbers 
suggests that the regression approach can be improved by using the event count 
method, which takes into account the issue of overdispersion (negative binomial), as the 
variance for H is far higher than its mean. 
                                                 
generally used by practitioners as a rule of thumb for the catchment area. Additionally, note that 
the minimum feasible radius is constrained to the existence of sufficient variation in the data. 
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Std. Dev.   
Variable Mean Overall Between Within Source 
H 207528.50 192055.40 188200.70 48605.20 BSM 
VEH 281.30 119.84 116.54 33.55 ” 
GF 1.72 0.25 0.20 0.14 ” 
GS 98.66 22.59 22.44 4.41 ” 
CPS 218.58 133.38 130.20 35.60 ” 
MPS 661.31 538.57 502.65 209.27 ” 
RPS 148.56 285.04 287.17 29.42 ” 
FPS 138.55 301.69 190.00 236.29 ” 
RF 2.49 0.21 0.17 0.13 ” 
POB 22570.68 10172.79 10287.97 568.25 BCN Stat.Dept. 
RCAR 354.18 83.93 83.33 16.58 ” 
LANDV 403.59 122.69 105.12 65.45 DTES Gencat 
Table 1. Summary of descriptive statistics, information source, and expected signs in OCC and SUB models 
In the SUB model we measure garage parking demand as the number of 24 equivalent 
parking contracts subscribed (), as there are different subscription modalities that 
allow parking access at different times (day, noon, overnight and weekends). In this case, 
changes in occupancy rate provide no information about subscribers’ demand, as we are 
interested in how many parkers want to buy the right to parking spaces for a certain 
period of time, not how long they stay each time. This figure follows a normal distribution, 
and can be found in the annual reports of BSM parking facilities (only in aggregate 
terms). 
The characteristics of the garages are also extracted from the BSM parking facilities’ 
annual reports. Garage fare () is measured as the average hourly fare by computing 
the ratio between yearly revenue raised from short stay vehicles and yearly purchased 
parking hours (including cash-in advance options). The fact that the public authority has 
adopted a city-wide garage pricing scheme eliminates a possible endogeneity issue, as 
the garage parking fare does not change in response to garage demand. 
Subscription cost () is measured as the average monthly subscription by computing 
the ratio between the yearly revenue raised from long stay vehicles and the yearly 
number of subscribed vehicles, divided by 12 months. Unlike garage fares in the OCC 
model, garage subscription costs do not follow a uniform pricing scheme. However, the 
correlation coefficient between the log of subscription cost and the log number of 
subscribers is only 0.11, which suggests that there is no special problem of endogeneity. 
We assume that demand is only affected by on-street parking characteristics within a 
garages’ potential catchment area (D). Thus, alternative parking supply is captured by 
the number of free (), commercial () and mixed use parking spaces () 
within the 500-meter catchment area. For facilities where ÀREA was initially not fully 
implemented, free parking supply is computed as the difference between the maximum 
total number of parking spaces before the ÀREA extension and the regulated supply. 
The impact of curbside parking regulation on garage demand Gragera & Albalate (2015)  
 
  11 / 24 
 
After full extension, it is set to 1, in order to avoid problems with the log specification, 
even it was set to zero as all free parking was eliminated. 
The on-street parking fare () is computed as the weighted average fare for 
commercial and mixed use spaces within the catchment area. The SUB model 
additionally includes resident-exclusive parking spaces () within the 500-meter 
buffer around each facility. 
All these figures are conveniently estimated using geographic information systems (GIS) 
software, based on BSM data maps9 and BSM (2013). The inclusion of garage-specific 
fixed effects controls for the endogeneity of the on-street fare, as garage demand may 
be high where on-street demand and fares are also high. However, this still excludes the 
case where changes in the on-street fare over time are a response to garage demand 
changes. As long as these adjustments in prices are a political decision rather than a 
response to demand changes, we find our previous assumption to be valid, as stated in 
Madsen et al. (2013). 
In order to cope with a neighborhood’s time-varying characteristics, we computed the 
number of thousands of inhabitants () within the catchment area. This figure is 
computed as the neighborhood-weighted average population with a weight proportional 
to the neighborhood area, overlaid with the 500-meter buffer for each BSM garage, using 
GIS software. This is obviously a proxy for the number of residents in the catchment 
area, as it assumes that population is uniformly distributed in each neighborhood. This 
assumption is fairly reliable for all neighborhoods except the city fringe (facility locations 
from this area are not included in our sample). 
The same procedure has also been applied to account for the density of cars () 
per thousand of inhabitants registered within each buffer. Additionally, we introduce the 
average real estate selling price () in thousands of euros10 at district level as a 
proxy for income. All previous neighborhood figures are reported by Barcelona City 
Council’s statistics department. 
Other neighborhood characteristics that affect parking demand and vary over facilities 
but remain fixed over time, such as economic activity or commercial areas, are assumed 
to be captured by garage-specific fixed effects (	). However, some intrinsic catchment 
area characteristics that affect long stay parking demand are not fixed and may vary 
randomly, for example, the amount of private parking that is available. Additionally, we 
                                                 
9
 Previous data maps were provided by BSM. The current version of this map is available at the 
ÀREA web page: http://www.areaverda.cat/en/map/ 
10
 All monetary units are expressed in current terms. 
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include a time-specific effect (
) to explore possible ÀREA expansion effects, any 
potential time trend, or specific shocks affecting demand (such as economic recession). 
4.3 Model specifications 
In the occasional parkers (OCC) model, the aggregate demand function dependent 
variable is defined as yearly parking purchased hours (). We specify this variable 
using negative binomial regression11 with a common log-linear specification for the   
parameter and explanatory variables as expressed in (2)12. The estimated parameters in 
(2) can be interpreted as demand semi-elasticities. 
In the subscribers’ parking (SUB) model, the aggregate demand function dependent 
variable is defined as the number of vehicles or parking contract subscribers (), 
specified in a log-linear13 form with explanatory variables as depicted in (3). Least 
squares estimated parameters are interpreted as demand elasticities. 
In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate fixed (FE) and random 
effects (RE) specifications for both models14. To choose between them, we check for the 
correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors, using the Hausman 
test. All the previous models’ specifications are estimated using cluster-robust standard 
errors, with clustering on the garage facilities to control for the remaining 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within facilities. 
We estimate both OCC and SUB models with the parking regulation and neighborhood 
characteristic variables for a 500-meter buffer around each garage facility. The aim is to 
analyze the interactions between garage demand and curbside regulation, and check 
the area around each garage for which it is relevant. 
 
                                                 
11
 We also estimated the Poisson counterparts of these models, but the Lagrange Multiplier test 
allows us to reject the null of no overdispersion. The need to consider unobserved heterogeneity 
either by NBFE or NBRE is confirmed by the LR test. 
12
 See Hausman et al. (1984) for further detail on the negative binomial regression specification 
13
 We tested three alternative functional forms and decided on goodness of fit (log-likelihood). 
Additionally, log-linear functional form was adopted in similar empirical works, such as Ottoson et 
al. (2013). 
14
 The need to consider garage-specific effects is highlighted by a joint significance test with a 
null hypothesis of equality between all garage-specific dummies’ coefficients. 
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!( ) = 	 + 
 + β$() + β%() + β&() + β'() + β(() + β)()
+ β*(+) + β,() + β-(.) +  
(2) 
!() = 	 + 
 + β$!() + β%!() + β&!() + β'!() + β(!()
+ β)!() + β*!() + β,!() + β-!() +  
(3) 
where:  
	 = garage-specific fixed effects  

 = time-specific effect  
 = number of yearly purchased parking hours (in facility  and period )  
 = number of parking contract subscribers (in facility  and period )  
 = weighted average garage parking fare (€/h)  
 = weighted average garage subscription cost (€/month)  
 = number of commercial use parking spaces within D  
 = number of mixed use parking spaces within D  
 = number of resident-exclusive parking spaces within D  
 = number of free parking spaces within D  
 = on-street weighted average parking fare within D  
 = number of inhabitants within D  
 = ratio of cars per inhabitant within D  
 = average real estate selling price (€) within D  
5 Results and discussion 
In this section, we present and discuss the results for the demand functions estimated 
for the two demand segments: occasional parkers (OCC) and parking subscribers (SUB). 
As all tests indicate a preference for the fixed-effects model, we only show its results for 
both models15. Additionally, to facilitate the comparison between both demand segments, 
                                                 
15
 In order to choose between fixed-effect and random-effects, the Hausman test is computed for 
both models. In the case of OCC, the test indicates the rejection of the null of no correlation 
between unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors (H = 15.48 with a p-value lower than 0.03), 
which suggests that NBFE should be used as it is surely consistent. A similar conclusion can be 
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we also report the elasticities at mean values for both models. All these figures are shown 
in Table 2. 
In this Table, we can see that both OCC and SUB demands are negatively related to the 
garage fare/hour (GF) and the monthly subscription cost (GS), respectively. For OCC, a 
1€/hour increase in garage fare yields a 69% reduction in the number of purchased 
parking hours, which translates into an average elasticity at the mean of -1.19. In a similar 
way, the elasticity of SUB demand to monthly subscription cost across buffers is -1.11. 
If we compare the estimated coefficients, we can see that both OCC and SUB demands 
are fairly elastic, and below the estimates reported by Kobus et al. (2013) for an average 
stay of 1.2 hours, but in the upper bound of the range reported for curbside demand by 
Concas & Nayak (2012)16. 
Using a z-test, we checked the null hypothesis that the coefficients for OCC and SUB 
are equal. This result does not appear to agree with Tsamboulas’s (2001) finding that 
subscribers’ response to the fare differential is twice that of occasional parkers. However, 
Tsamboulas’s estimates refer to a change in parking location when occasional parkers 
really can reduce their parking duration, park elsewhere, shift mode or desist from 
travelling. In contrast, subscribers are unlikely to change parking duration, avoid traveling 
or change transport mode as their trip is very frequent and probably highly constrained, 
leaving only a change in parking location as a feasible option. This reasoning suggests 
that the impact on aggregate demand can plausibly be of the same magnitude, as we 
report. 
Interesting differences arise in curbside parking spaces, as both demand segments show 
quite different sensitivities to the types of regulated spaces. OCC demand is negatively 
related with the number of commercial spaces (CPS), with an estimated elasticity at the 
mean of -0.27. In contrast, commercial spaces show a positive relation with SUB demand 
of +0.13. This suggests that commercial spaces act as a curbside substitute for 
occasional garage parking, but act as a curbside constraint for subscribers. This opposite 
effect in each garage demand segment should be taken into account by public authorities 
when they change curbside regulations, as it might transfer demand to the curb and alter 
garage revenues. 
Changing the provision of mixed use parking spaces has no statistically significant 
impact on OCC or SUB demand at any given buffer. The widespread extension of this 
particular type of spaces has been justified by the assumption that resident parking 
                                                 
drawn for the SUB (H = 35.68 with a p-value lower than 0.01). Alternative estimation results can 
be made available upon request. 
16
 In their sample, average fare elasticity was -0.48, with a standard deviation of ±0.65. If we only 
consider non-US studies with higher average price elasticities (-0.69), the range is expanded. 
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permits act as an additional constraint to occasional parkers, and might help to shift 
demand to off-street facilities, regardless of the pricing strategy. Our results clearly do 
not backup this assumption. We hypothesize that residents’ monopolization of the use 
of these spaces translates into more cruising, while commercial spaces can further help 
to shift demand towards garages. 
 OCC SUB 
Variables (2) (2’) (3) 
GF -0.695*** -1.195  
 
(0.0780)   
GS   -1.109*** 
 
 
 (0.290) 
MPS -2.68e-05 n/s -0.00495 
 (7.69e-05)  (0.0303) 
CPS -0.00124*** -0.271 0.132** 
 (0.000306)  (0.0508) 
RPS   -0.0546* 
 
 
 (0.0245) 
FPS -0.000108 -0.014 -0.0102* 
 (7.39e-05)  (0.00421) 
RF 0.308*** 0.768 -0.100 
 (0.119)  (0.776) 
POP -1.12e-05 n/s 1.118*** 
 (8.96e-06)  (0.191) 
RCAR -0.000347 n/s 0.734** 
 (0.000666)  (0.201) 
LANDV 0.000607** 0.244 0.190** 
 (0.000287)  (0.0736) 
Constant 5.015***  -6.356** 
  (0.497)  (2.541) 
Obs. 238  238 
R2   0.22545943 
F   28863381 
LL -22,674,052   
Chi2 32846132    
Table 2. Estimated demand equations for OCC and SUB models. For the OCC model (2), reports estimated semi-
elasticities and (2’) the elasticities at mean values. For the SUB model (3), reports estimated elasticities. Standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Time dummies are not 
reported. 
Changes in the provision of free parking spaces negatively affect SUB garages’ demand, 
with an estimated elasticity of -0.01. The fact that we found no relevant impact on OCC 
does not mean that increasing the number of free spaces does not potentially undermine 
the demand for garages, as it is expected that occasional parkers are far more sensitive 
to walking time (Tsamboulas, 2001). This suggests that occasional parkers will only be 
affected by changes in the provision of free parking within an acceptable walking 
distance, which we assume from our results will be far less than 500 m to the garage 
facility. 
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Additionally, resident-exclusive spaces (RPS) do show a negative relation with 
subscribers’ parking demand, with estimated elasticities of -0.05 (higher than the 
response to FPS)17. This confirms that residents represent a relevant share of garage 
subscribers, and suggests that granting parking permits to residents does undermine the 
shift of long stay parking to off-street facilities. 
The curbside weighted average regulated fare also has a different impact on both 
demand segments. We find positive cross-elasticity for occasional parkers, as a €1 
increase in curbside fee shifts 31% of demand to garage parking, which is equivalent to 
0.77 elasticity at mean values. This indicates a clear substitution effect between curbside 
and garage parking, as previously suggested in Kobus et al. (2013), even though there 
are no cross-elasticity estimates to compare ours with. 
Additionally, the fact that cross-elasticity is below own-elasticity suggests that the 
curbside might be preferred to garage parking. Computation of the ratio between garage 
and curbside fee semi-elasticities in OCC yields a curbside premium of €0.5518, which is 
in line with the figures reported in Kobus et al. (2013). This is of special relevance in the 
case of Barcelona, as garage parking fares are systematically higher than curbside fares. 
Our finding suggests that in 2012 pricing efficiency gap for the users that face no garage 
fare discount can range between €0.45 and €1.05 depending on the area, the type of 
space, and the associated fare scheme implemented around each garage facility19; as 
shown in Figure 1. This is the case as BSM applies a uniform garage parking fare policy, 
in fulfillment of the political agreement reached by city council20; which also sets fare 
increases indexed to CPI. These measures translated into uniform fares have usually 
been justified by policy makers on the grounds of fairness and equity. However, this 
mismatch between curbside and garage pricing regimes shows the uncoupling in the 
political perception of such substitutive goods. This is highlighted by the fact that on-
street and off-street parking fares are set by independent political agreements and public 
authority manages both as separate business units (with their own operating accounts). 
                                                 
17
 Note that RPS is not included in the OCC model as these spaces are restricted only to 
residential parking, and no alternative is available for occasional parkers. 
18
 Equating the demand changes induced by a €1 curbside fare increase with respect to a €1 
increase in the garage fare, we obtain the proportional valuation of one over the other. The 
remaining part up to equivalent valuation is assumed to be the curbside premium (1 − β
5
/β
1
) per 
each euro increased. 
19
 The price efficiency gap we provide is computed by subtracting curbside average weighted fare 
to the regular garage fare per hour with no discounts (2.80€/h – RF); then adding up the estimated 
curbside premium (0.55€/h). Note that regular users that purchase a garage pass with discount 
fares will face much lower gap. 
20
 City Council Agreement adopted by the Mobility and Security Comission on July 12th 2007. 
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In this regard we would recommend the public authority to follow a non-homogeneous 
and coordinated curbside and garage parking pricing scheme. 
 
Figure 2. Price efficiency gap for the garage facilities included in our sample in 2012 (Computed as the difference 
between GF and RF plus the proxied curbside premium). 
The price efficiency gap highlights the key role of a garage versus curbside fare 
differential in parking regulations, as relative reductions in curbside fare will transfer 
users towards the curb, reducing performance and increasing associated externalities. 
This stresses the need for the public authority to undertake a single integrated market 
regulation approach. To correct the price efficiency gap public authority can either 
increase curbside price, reduce public garage prices or chose some middle ground 
combination of both. We would recommend public authority to equate garage prices to 
marginal cost and increase curbside price up to a premium above garage prices. If this 
curbside price increases is politically unfeasible we would recommend to explore the 
option to increase curbside price as much as possible and reduce garage price below 
marginal cost, setting a cross subsidy between the curb and garages as suggested in 
Arnott (2006). 
It is relevant to highlight that the price efficiency gap issue is even bigger for the private 
garage sector, as public garages are on average about 8% cheaper (BSM, 2013). Public 
authority needs to include private sector on its integrated market regulation approach, 
otherwise private operators might act strategically taking advantage of curbside price 
increases and the impact of policy intervention would be hampered. Inci & Lindsey (2015) 
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suggest that efficiency can be reached by regulating private sector prices; however this 
kind of regulation would be highly unlikely due to political constraints. In a market with 
high sunk cost and long assets time span this type of change in regulation will translate 
into a major cut in profitability that will imply a strong opposition, discouraging private 
investment and compromising off-street garage supply. Thus, we would rather 
recommend the public authority to explore the introduction of competition to discipline 
private sector prices. And taking into account that a cross-subsidy might be welfare 
enhancing it might also be advisable to explore potential public-private partnerships that 
link curbside management to garage concessions. However, the interaction between 
public and private agents in this market is not well stablished and needs further research. 
Additionally, this substitution effect also endorses the dependence between garage and 
curbside demand. According to our estimates, it cannot be neglected, as also stated in 
Madsen et al. (2013). This indicates the need to further develop existing curbside 
transaction data demand models to simultaneous curbside and garage modelling for 
occasional parkers; an approach that has not yet been taken into account in the empirical 
literature (Ottosson et al., 2013; Madsen et al., 2013; and Ibeas et al., 2011). This is very 
relevant as all previous parking demand elasticity estimates are potentially biased 
(including the ones we report). 
However, the curbside fare has no statistically significant impact for subscribers, which 
indicates that there is no substitution effect for this demand segment between on-street 
and off-street. This is in line with Khodaii et al. (2010) and Kobus et al. (2013), as short 
stay parkers are more sensitive than long stay users. However, our results go one step 
further and indicate that garage subscribers are not sensitive at all. This additionally 
suggests that subscribers and occasional parkers might be pretty independent demand 
segments. But yet, even we do not consider it in this paper, an issue that needs further 
consideration is the fact that subscribers might find closer substitutes in off-street private 
parking supply (monthly rents) which will be affected by parking minimum requirements, 
private parking office availability and specific regulations. 
All this shows that curbside parking regulations are a relevant determinant of garage 
demand, and public authorities should make an effort to manage them as a single 
system. Our results indicate that the way curbside parking spaces are regulated (parking 
allowance and time limits) has a considerable impact. Reducing the total supply of 
curbside spaces will shift occasional parkers to garages; even curbside fare policy is an 
even more efficient trigger for behavioral change. This advocates for shifting Barcelona’s 
actual parking policy to embrace pricing full potential implementing more complex 
schemes (Shoup, 2005). If the goal is to shift cars from on-street to off-street parking 
while ensuring cost recovery, then the proper combination of pricing and spaces in the 
policy can help to achieve this. 
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Finally, OCC and SUB models differ in the impact of neighborhood characteristics on 
aggregate demand. The population (POB) shows no statistically significant relation with 
OCC, which could be due to the fact that occasional parkers do not need to reside in the 
garage area. In contrast, as expected SUB is strongly positively related to population, as 
residents are probably the largest group of users in need of a parking subscription. 
The car ownership ratio (RCAR) is only positively related to SUB, with an estimated 
elasticity in the number of cars per inhabitant of 0.73. This shows that car ownership 
changes are an important driver of parking subscriptions. As expected, OCC shows no 
statistically significant relation with the car ownership ratio, as occasional parkers’ 
demand is mainly driven by visitors. 
Land value changes (LANDV) do show a positive relation with OCC and SUB of about 
the same magnitude, even though the interpretation of the meaning of this variable in 
each case is different. OCC estimated elasticity at mean values is about 0.24, which 
could capture the type of economic activities that take place in the area (unobservable 
for us), suggesting the need to further consider the spatial distribution of economic 
activity. However, SUB estimated elasticity is 0.19, which is in line with the range of 
estimates reported by Gillen (1977). 
6 Conclusions 
The impact of curbside parking regulation on garage parking demand is investigated in 
this paper. Specifically, we analyze the aggregate demand behavior of two demand 
segments: occasional (OCC) and subscribers’ parking (SUB). Two econometric models 
are proposed, one for each of these demand segments. The aggregate demand 
functions of the OCC and SUB models are estimated using a panel from Barcelona’s 
public parking authority (BSM) that covers 34 garage facilities with yearly data for the 
period 2006-2012. The OCC model is specified as an event count model estimated by 
means of negative binomial specifications, and the SUB model is estimated by least 
squares adapted to panel data; both accounting for garage-specific fixed effects and 
time-specific shocks. This method is far less data-demanding than existing 
microeconometric approaches and it can be easily applied to any cities, regardless of 
their parking data-gathering technology; where only enough yearly summaries need to 
be available. 
This approach allows us to provide the first empirical estimates reported in the literature 
for garage demand responsiveness by segments (occasional parkers and subscribers). 
Our estimates show that both garage demand segments are fairly responsive to their 
own price, with elasticities close to the curbsides’ upper bound figures. Both occasional 
parkers and subscribers of garages show the same sensitivity to garage fare and 
subscription cost, respectively. 
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Regarding curbside pricing interaction, we find that occasional parkers show high 
curbside fare cross-elasticity; while subscribers hold no statistically significant relation. 
This indicates a clear substitution effect between curbside and garage parking for 
occasional parkers. Whether subscribers might find closer substitutes in off-street private 
parking supply (monthly rents) or not, which will be affected by parking minimum 
requirements, private parking office availability and specific regulations, will need further 
research as it is beyond the purpose of our analysis. 
The fact that the cross-elasticity for occasional parkers is below own-elasticity suggests 
that the curbside might be preferred to garage parking (curbside premium). All this 
highlights the key role of a fare differential between curbside and garage to achieve 
efficient parking demand allocation, and the relevance of undertaking an integrated 
curbside/garage market management approach, as already claimed in theoretical works 
(Arnott, 2006; Inci & Lindsey, 2015). In our specific case, the estimates also show the 
huge pricing efficiency gap that exists in Barcelona, driven by a homogeneous public 
garage parking fare policy and uncoupling between curbside and garage regulation. 
Regarding regulations on curbside spaces, we find that both demand segments show 
quite different sensitivities to the types of regulated spaces. OCC demand is negatively 
related to the number of commercial spaces, while the relation with subscribers is 
positive. This suggests that commercial spaces act as a curbside substitute for 
occasional garage parking, but act as a curbside constraint for subscribers. 
Mixed use spaces have no statistically significant impact on OCC or SUB demand at any 
given buffer, which contradicts the common assumption used to justify these spaces, as 
resident permits do not seem to lead to any additional demand shift from the curb to 
garages (as in the case of commercial spaces). The provision of free and resident-
exclusive parking spaces has a small, negative effect on subscribers’ demand, while 
occasional parkers show no response, presumably due to the comparatively higher 
walking cost. 
All this shows that curbside parking regulations are a relevant determinant of garage 
demand, and public authorities should make an effort to manage the curbside/garage 
parking market as a single system. Our results show that the characteristics of curbside 
parking spaces (allowance and time limits) and the pricing strategy play a role in garage 
demand determination, with relevant differences between demand segments. Curbside 
fare policy is an even more efficient trigger for behavioral change, and the proper 
combination of pricing and spaces policy needs to be applied to avoid counterbalancing 
its effects. Thus, the development of future parking pricing schemes must take into 
account curbside and garage interactions. 
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